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JAMES HENRY BERGERON, PHILLIP O'NEIL, JOHN HARRINGTON, AND CYNTHIA
TODGHAM CHERNIAK*
This article surveys developments in national security law during 2011.'
I. NATO Operation Unified Protector
In response to the escalating violence against "Arab Spring" protests by the Qadhafi
government, on February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council enacted resolution 1970
(UNSCR 1970) imposing an arms embargo on Libya, as well as an asset freeze and travel
ban on the core Libyan political leadership. 2 In the resolution, the Council also referred
allegations of atrocities to -the International Criminal Court. 3 With Libyan government
forces driving towards Benghazi, on March 17 the Security Council enacted resolution
1973 (UNSCR 1973) that demanded the "immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a
complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians," in the context of
a solution that responded to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people. 4 Resolution
1973 also provided Chapter VII authorization 5 to enforce the arms embargo, a no-fly
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1. For developments during 2010, see John Harrington et al., National Security, 45 INT'L LAw. 425
(2011). For developments during 2009, see Derek Gilman et al., National Security, 44 INT'L LAW. 535 (2010).
2. See S.C. Res. 1970, IT 9, 17, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc resolutionsll.htm. For additional developments, see the Africa Committee's
2012 article and the Middle East Committee's 2012 article.
3. See id. T 4. For additional developments, see the International Criminal Law Committee's 2012 article.
4. S.C. Res. 1973, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
unsc~jesolutions I 1.hon.
5. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf.
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zone, and, in paragraph 4, "to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and
civilian-populated areas under threat of attack .... ,"6 Of note, paragraph 4 provided that
this mandate was "notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970," the arms embargo
provision of the previous resolution.7
On March 19, a U.S.-led coalition commenced military operations against the Libyan
government and its forces to roll back the threat to Benghazi and to remove Libyan air
defenses. The coalition included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway,
Qatar, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Attention quickly shifted to
NATO to assume responsibility for the operation. Operation Unified Protector (OUP)
was launched on March 23, initially with a limited mandate to enforce the maritime arms
embargo. But this was quickly followed by assumption of the no-fly zone on March 25
and of the civilian protection mission on March 31, ending the coalition operation in favor
of a full NATO mission. Operation Unified Protector was exclusively an air and maritime
operation-there were no NATO forces on the ground in Libya, an occupation force of
any kind being ruled out by UNSCR 1973.8
OUP conducted a maritime embargo under UNSCR 1970 and 1973. Paragraph 9 of
Resolution 1970 prohibited the import and export
of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforemen-
tioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to mili-
tary activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel,
including the provision of armed mercenary personnel .... 9
The U.N. Sanctions Committee established under the resolution was not charged with
compiling a list of sanctioned goods under this provision; rather, the Committee was em-
powered to make exceptions to the broad scope of the embargo provided in paragraph 9.
That placed the burden of determining the scope of the embargo on NATO. The issue
was further complicated by the explicit linkage provided by paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973,
mandating that all necessary measures should be used to protect civilians and civilian-
populated areas under threat of attack notwithstanding the provisions of UNSFCR 1970 on
the arms embargo. Some interpreted this linkage to mean that arming the opposition
would not have been a violation of UNSCR 1970, although only France ever publicly
relied on that interpretation.10
6. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, T 4.
7. Id.
8. A small number of national military advisers from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy were sent to
the Transitional National Council headquarters in Benghazi in April, but acted outside of the NATO mission.
See Bruno Waterfield, Libya: British Military Ddvisors Set Up "Joint Operations Centre" in Benghazi, THE TELE-
GRAPH (May 18, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianoceanlibya/8521977/
Libya-British-military-advisers-set-up-joint-operations-centre-in-Benghazi.htm.
9. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2, T 9.
10. See Nicholas Watt, US Paves Way to Arm Libyan Rebels, THE GuARDLAN (Mar. 29, 2011), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/mar/29/arms-libya-rebels; Nicholas Watt, Libya: Britain Backs Clinton View
That U.N. Has Sanctioned Arming Rebels, THE GUARDi (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
201 1/mar/30/libyan-britain-clinton-un-rebels. The only instance where a NATO ally admitted arming the
Libyan opposition was a French statement that it had provided arms and ammunition to opposition forces in
Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains during May 2011. The French government did not claim authorization
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The scope of the arms embargo was tested at sea, where importation of heavy trucks,
4x4 overland vehicles, and large numbers of passenger cars were seen as presenting a
threat to civilians by aiding the regime's military action against besieged populations in
Misrata and elsewhere, often militarizing civilian vehicles.1'I Equally, the importation of
gasoline into regime-controlled areas of Libya was seen to present a significant threat by
fueling Qadhafi's war machine. In both cases, a joined reading of UNSCR 1970 and 1973
provided the mandate to prevent war-related material from entering the country that
posed a threat to civilians. To minimize disruption to commercial shipping, a robust sys-
tem of Naval Control and Guidance to Shipping was instituted by the NATO Maritime
Command in Naples, by which humanitarian aid vessels sponsored by OUP Allies and
partner nations, or humanitarian aid organizations, were cleared for entry in Libya. Other
importers of goods into Libya were encouraged to request guidance as to whether their
cargo presented embargo concerns.12 This guidance provided by NATO did not ensure
that no boarding would be conducted of the vessel, but it provided valuable reassurance of
how the NATO maritime force would treat cargo entering or exiting Libya by sea, al-
lowing shippers to make other arrangements if the cargo or product type raised embargo
concerns. As of September 20, a total of 2,748 vessels had been hailed, 290 vessels
boarded, and eleven vessels denied entry or exit from Libyan ports.13
The efforts to protect civilians and enforce the no-fly zone under UNSCR 1973 were
notable by the extreme care taken to minimize civilian casualties. More than 26,500 sor-
ties were flown, of which 9,700 were strike sorties. 14 More than 5,900 military targets
were destroyed, including the bulk of the regime's operational military command and
control centers, more than 400 artillery and rocket launchers, and more than 600 tanks or
armored vehicles. 15 Confirmed reports of civilian casualties were exceedingly low, limited
mostly to weapons malfunction and misidentification of opposition forces as regime forces
when both were in close combat.16 Given the intensity of the operation, that was a re-
markable achievement, gained through the efforts of hundreds of targeting experts and the
under UNSCR 1973 directly for the air drop of weapons and ammunition, but claimed that disregard of
UNSCR 1970 was required to protect civilians. See David Jolly & Kareem Fahim, France Says it Gave Arms to
the Rebels in Libya, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/
europe/30france.html?_r=l.
11. See Mohammed Abbas, UK Short of Libya Targets, Not Resources-Source, REtrrERS (July 14, 2011), hnep://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/britain-defence-libya-idUSL6E7EOX720110714.
12. See Operation Unified Protector NATO-led Arms Embargo against Libya, FACT SHEET (NATO, Brussels,
Belg.), June 2011, available at http://www.nato.int/natostatic/assets/pdf/pd_2011_06/20110608_Factsheet-
UPArmsEmbargo.pdf; see also Non-Sensitive Information Release, NATO, NATO Embargo Operations in
the Vicinity of Libya (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.aegirshipbrokers.com/images/110324_Engagement_-
Embargo.LBY.pdf.
13. NATO and Libya: Operational Media Update for 20 September, OPERATION MEDIA UPDATE (NATO,
Brussels, Belg.), Sept. 21, 2011, available at www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf._2011_09/20110921_1109
21-oup-update.pdf.
14. Operation Unified Protector: Final Mission Stats, FACT SHEET (NATO, Brussels, Belg.), Nov. 2, 2011,
available at http://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011-11/20111108-111107-factsheet up-
factsfigures-en.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See NATO Regrets Loss of Life from Ajdahiya Strike, BBC NEws (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa- 13010170.
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use of extremely precise and very expensive precision weapons. 17 The OUP experience
sets a very high threshold for acceptable collateral losses in future conflicts.
The NATO mission was based on UNSCR 1973's demand for a ceasefire and that all
threats to civilians and civilian-populated areas cease. The language of the resolution was
directed towards the regime, and in practice, it was overwhelmingly regime forces that
used force as a conscious policy against non-combatant civilians from the onset of the
conflict. On April 14, the NATO Berlin Ministerial meeting set out the Alliance's inter-
pretation of the U.N. requirement, stating that it would maintain its military pressure on
regime forces until all attacks and threats of attacks against civilians had ceased, regime
forces had returned to bases and had vacated a number of specified urban areas, and un-
hindered access was allowed for humanitarian aid.' 8 It was notable that throughout the
crisis, the Qadhafi regime never seriously attempted to disengage its forces from the front
lines or to cease indiscriminate attacks on non-combatant civilians in opposition-held
towns and cities. Had it done so, a serious question over the scope of the U.N. mandate
for further NATO action against regime military forces could well have arisen.
Operation Unified Protector continued to conduct operations under UNSCR 1973 un-
til October 31, when the mission was ended.' 9 Those months witnessed the darkest days
of the siege of Misrata by regime forces in early May, intense fighting in the villages of the
Berber highlands in May and June, and the remarkable uprising of Tripoli in August that
shifted the operational balance against the regime and in favor of the forces of the Transi-
tional National Council (TNC), now widely recognized as the legitimate interim gov-
erning authority in Libya. By October, Qadhafi's control over Libya dwindled to his
hometown of Sirte and neighboring village of Ben Walid. On October 20, after an
aborted attempt to flee Sirte in a convoy, Qadhafi was captured and killed.20 The two
towns fell to the TNC shortly thereafter and on October 23, the TNC declared Libya
liberated. 21 NATO's North Atlantic Council decided to end the mission on October 31,
the day that the U.N. Security Council set under UNSCR 2016 to end most of its Chap-
ter VII mandate authorized by UNSCR 1973.22 At the time of writing, portions of UN-
SCR 1970 and the UNSCR 1973 power to enforce the remaining portions of the arms
embargo remain in force, although NATO no longer has that mission.
17. See 'Smart' Bombs Used over Libya, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
defence-and-security-blog/201 1/jun/16/libya-civilian-casualties; see also Counting the Cost of NATO's Mission in
Libya, BBC NEws ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15528984.
18. See Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Non-NATO
Contributors to Operation Unified Protector, NATO (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
officiaLtexts_72544.htm.
19. See NATO Poised to End Libya Operations, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
uk/feedarticle/9908402.
20. See Gaddafi Killed in Hometown, Libya Eyes Future, REuTERs (Oct. 21, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2011/10/20/us-libya-idUSTRE79F1FK20111020.
21. See Libya's New Rulers Declare Country Liberated, BBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa- 15422262.
22. See S.C. Res. 2016, $1 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/docAJNDOC/GEN/N11/567/10/PDF/NI 156710.pdfOpenElement.
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II. E.U. Common Security and Defense Policy
The European Union continued a number of established military Common Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions in 2011. These included the counter-piracy mis-
sion, Operation Atalanta, conducted by the E.U. Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) off the
Horn of Africa, the E.U. ALTHEA peacekeeping mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, and the
E.U. training mission in Somalia. Continuing civilian missions include the E.U. police
support missions in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Pales-
tinian Territories, E.U. rule of law support missions in Kosovo and Iraq, the E.U. moni-
toring mission in Georgia, and border security missions in Moldova/Ukraine and in
Rafah.23
On February 28, 2011, the European Council commenced sanctions against Libya
under UNSCR 1970, including the arms embargo, asset freeze, and travel bans.2 4 Follow-
ing UNSCR 1973 and the establishment of NATO's Operation Unified Protector, on
April 1, the European Council established an E.U. military mission in support of humani-
tarian assistance to the people of Libya. EUFOR Libya was mandated to contribute to the
evacuation and safe movement of displaced persons and to support the operations of hu-
manitarian aid agencies.25 The operation was predicated on a request from the U.N. Of-
fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. But such a request was never made,
and the mission remained in a state of planning and readiness until its wind-up in October
2011.
Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extended on October 10, under a new
U.N. mandate. The mission will reduce its forces and shift focus to capacity building and
training. A deterrent capability would be preserved via an 'over the horizon' force supple-
mented by regular in-country reconnaissance. 26
In the area of CSDP institutional developments, Poland, France, and Germany (known
as the 'Weimar Triangle') submitted a letter on December 6 to E.U. High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, calling for the Permanent
Structured Co-operation (PSC) clause of the Lisbon Treaty to be operationalized. 27 This
provision (Lisbon Treaty on European Union, Article 42.6 and Article 46) allows a group
of E.U. member states to collaborate within the E.U. institutional process on enhanced
joint procurement and operational planning. At its meeting on January 31, the European
Council welcomed the Weimar letter and tasked High Representative Baroness Ashton to
take forward a consideration of the proposals. On May 23, the Foreign Affairs Council
23. See EU Operations: Overview of the Missions and Operations of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION
EXTERNAL ACTION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?amp;lang=en (last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
24. See Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP, Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in
Libya, 2011 O.J. (L. 58) 53-55, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
2011:058:0053:0062:EN:PDF.
25. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Decides on EU Military Operation in Support
of Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/121241.pdf.
26. Foreign Affairs Council Addresses BiH, Libya and the MEPP, E.U. SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEWS (Oct.
14, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/125152.pdf.
27. Julian Hale, Poland Presidency Focus: E.U. Civil-Military Policy, DEFENCE NEWS (une 30, 2011), http:/
www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6965691.
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issued its conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, supporting further
efforts at the E.U. level to enhance collective capability, but stressing the nation-driven
and voluntary nature of the enterprise. 28
The PSC issue became more heated after summer 2011, when focus centered on using
it to establish a permanent E.U. Operational Headquarters capable of commanding E.U.
battle groups. The United States and the United Kingdom long opposed the permanent
E.U. headquarters concept as duplicative of NATO planning capabilities. U.K. Foreign
Minister William Hague publicly rejected the idea July 18.29 Press reports state that the
Weimar Group, plus Italy and Spain, urged Baroness Ashton to push forward with an
E.U.-operational-headquarters-based PSC over Hague's opposition.30
I. Nonproliferation
As 2011 drew to a close, the climb up the escalatory ladder in counter-proliferation
continued in calibrated steps as the concerns of the United States, its allies, and other
nations mounted over nuclear program activities in Syria, North Korea, and Iran. Acting
in coalitions of the willing and through multilateral forums, the United States' 'layered'
defense against nuclear weapon proliferation erected new legal barriers to try to contain
and constrain such action, as the legal process evolved on multiple fronts.
U.S. multilateral efforts with respect to a Syrian nuclear program were rewarded on
June 9, 2011, when the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) found Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and
failure to provide required information a breach of Articles 41 and 42 of Syria's Safeguards
Agreement. This noncompliance was reported to the U.N. Security Council. But as po-
litical unrest in Syria devolved toward civil war, further enforcement action was deferred.
The nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea remained a
matter of serious concern, particularly amidst reports about construction progress on a
new uranium enrichment facility and light-water reactor. By year's end, concern mounted
that North Korea's enrichment program could be more advanced than that of Iran.
Meanwhile, although North Korea proposed a resumption of the six party talks and IAEA
inspection, the interested parties remained mired in a process disagreement over precon-
ditions, with the United States and its allies requiring suspension of uranium enrichment
activity before resuming negotiations. The IAEA remained unable to verify the correct-
ness and completion of North Korea's declaration or to implement any safeguards mea-
sures. North Korea continued to fail to implement the binding measures upon it pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which required, inter
alia, a return to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards. North Korean
28. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Pooling and Sharing of
Military Capabilities (May 23, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/122185.pdf.
29. Bruno Waterfield, Britain Blocks E.U. Plans for 'Operational Military Headquarters', THE TELEGRAPH
(July 18, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-
for-operational-military-headquarters.html.
30. Bruno Waterfield, Big 5 Tell Baroness Ashton to Bypass Britain over E.U. Military HQ, THE TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8747399/Big-five-teu-Baroness-
Ashton-to-bypass-Britain-over-EU-military-HQ.html.
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leader Kim Jong-EI died in late December 2011, but his death is not expected to change
North Korea's nuclear policies.
Finally, Iran remained on the front burner of the nonproliferation focus as its enrich-
ment activities continued. The Report of the IAEA Director General on November 8,
2011 on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
the U.N. Security Council Resolutions exposed additional areas of concern about possible
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. 31 Research, development, and testing ac-
tivity useful in designing a nuclear weapon were identified publically. The IAEA adopted
a resolution on November 18, 2011, expressing its concern about unresolved issues re-
garding the Iranian nuclear program and calling on Iran to engage seriously in talks to
"restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
program." 32
Although the ensuing multilateral legal response at the United Nations was muted by
compromise, unilateral escalation of sanctions by the United States and allies, such as
Great Britain, followed in short order. As part of the response, the United States imposed
sanctions on eleven entities and individuals associated with assisting Iran's nuclear pro-
gram. The U.S. Treasury Department, acting pursuant to powers granted under the PA-
TRIOT Act, designated Iran's banking section as a "primary money laundering
concern."33 A new executive order also meaningfully targeted Iran's energy sector in con-
straining developmental, maintenance, or expansion of the petroleum sector at low thresh-
old financial triggers.34 In these ways, the United States and its allies moved materially
past the targeted sanctions approach of the post-Iraq war era and into legal-based counter-
measures of broader potential impact on Iran's populace and regime. The ensuing re-
sponse exhibited Iran's capacity for asymmetric confrontation, for it seemingly retested
the bounds of the International Protected Persons Convention of 1973, when it appeared
to permit protestor occupation of the British Embassy before providing security. Mean-
while, as the year closed, the U.S. Congress attempted to push toward even stricter le-
gally-imposed countermeasures through amendments to the Defense Appropriation
legislation.
IV. Detention and Processing of Non-Military Combatants
The decade since the first detainees arrived in Guantinamo Bay has witnessed several
landmark legal battles that have collectively established the right of the prisoners there to
access federal courts on the U.S. mainland. During 2011, those legal landmarks gave way
to ideological differences fought within the political arena. President Barack Obama, hav-
ing committed to closing Guantinamo during the presidential campaign, following his
31. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Reso-
lutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011) available at http://www.iaea.org/
Pubilcations/Documents/Board/201 1/gov2011-65.pdf.
32. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Secur-
ity Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, GOV/2011/69 (Nov. 18, 2011) available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/201 l/gov20ll-69.pdf.
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election with a 2009 Executive Order 35 memorializing that intent, was faced this year by a
new mid-term Congress, dominated by an opposing Republican party unwilling to em-
brace the administration's course. Congress exercised its power over the purse strings,
specifically prohibiting the use of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained
at Guantgnamo, 36 and funds necessary to house them in the United States or its territo-
ries.37 The Congressional counterstroke caused President Obama to reconsider and even-
tually rescind his efforts to close the island prison, and reauthorize the use of military
commissions on site. The year concluded with the President signing the 2012 military
funding authorization on New Year's Eve, accompanied by an extensive remonstrance of
several portions of the new legislation pertaining to detention, trial, and release of the
detainees.3 8
Establishing procedures for the detention and trial of detainees in the decade since
September 11, 2001 has been a work in progress, including several tests of Bush adminis-
tration detention policy that rose to the U.S. Supreme Court prior to the current year.39
Analysis of these cases goes beyond the scope of this article, 4° but the result has been to
grant detainees habeas claims for access to Article HI courts to challenge their detention.
But the end of federal court involvement was marked by the sentencing on January 25,
2011 of former Guantvnamo detainee Ahmed Ghailani in a U.S. district court for his part
in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. Although the Obama administration hailed
the conviction as an example of the federal courts' capability to dispose of terror suspects,
many in Congress remained unconvinced. Members from both sides of the aisle were
concerned with the fact that Ghailani was convicted of a single count out of the 280
charges filed against him. For them, the conviction may as well have been an acquittal,
and the verdict was the rallying point to block the transfer of detainees from Guantinamo
to the mainland. As mentioned above, Congress cut off funding, and the administration
was obliged on March 7, 2011 to set forth perpetual review procedures for continued
detention, release, or transfer of suspects to a third country. 4' This announcement effec-
tively formalized indefinite detention of these subjects at Guantinamo. The reauthoriza-
tion of Guantinamo Bay impacts the course of trials for the five alleged co-conspirators
accused of planning the September 11 attacks, including mastermind Khalid Shiekh
35. Exec. Order-Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and
Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/closure-guanta-
namo-detention-facilities.
36. H.R. Con. Res. 6523, 111th Cong. § 1031 (2011) (enacted).
37. Id. § 1034.
38. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31,2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/3 1/statement-president-hr- 540.
39. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumidienne v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
40. See John R. Burroughs et al., Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT'L LAW. 471, 477-81 (2002);
John H. Harrington et al., National Security, 40 INT'L LAW. 487, 501-03 (2006).
41. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Exec. Order No. 13567-Periodic Review of Individuals
Detained at Guantinamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Mar. 7,
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-individuals-
detained-guant-namo-bay-nava.
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Muhammad. Shortly thereafter, on April 4, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder an-
nounced that trial of the 9/11 conspirators would be held in Guantinamo. 42
The institutionalization of GuantAnamo Bay begged for Congressional action to estab-
lish trial procedures. The dozens of habeas challenges had resulted in ad hoc common law
as a byproduct of nearly a decade of jurisprudence. With an emerging but inchoate com-
mon law, it was incumbent upon Congress to set forth procedures. To date, it was left to
the federal courts to establish burden of proof, evidence standards, applicability of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions, and other procedural
matters on a case-by-case basis. 43 Points of contention in Congress included whether and
under what circumstances the accused would be afforded the opportunity to view classified
evidence against them, whether they would be provided counsel, and regarding the right
to plead guilty. Arguments were sharpest in connection with the indefinite detention of
American citizens arrested within the United States, with treatment similar to foreign
aggressors detained abroad, including denial of constitutional rights and access to a law-
yer. The House and Senate debated conflicting standards, eventually arriving at legisla-
tion that was included within the 2012 defense authorization. President Obama, during
his signing ceremony in Hawaii, took exception to a number of the provisions therein.
The points raised by the President provide an insight into the present and future contro-
versies that are likely to continue as the procedures are implemented.
President Obama took exception with at least nine provisions in the authorization bill.4-
While the President cited concerns that echo the ongoing debate, he reserved the right to
interpret and apply the unpalatable provisions "in a manner that avoids undue harm to our
current operations," or "in a manner that preserves the operational flexibility of our
counterterrorism and law enforcement professionals," and that any that conflict with his
constitutional authorities will be treated as "non-binding."45 The provisions require the
Secretary of Defense to report on application of the Periodic Detention Review, 46 extend
the prohibition on funding for transfer of or facilities for detainees in the United States, 47
and require the Attorney General to 'consult' with the Secretary of Defense and Director
of National Intelligence on whether the subject should be brought before a civilian court
or military commission, and whether he should be maintained in civilian or military cus-
tody. It is unclear whether any parties will seek to uphold these provisions, if ignored by
the Administration, or whether they would be upheld on any legal challenge to their con-
stitutionality. An analysis of outcomes is beyond the scope this article, but it seems appar-
ent that the stage is set for future legal conflict in this area.
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Refers Five Accused 9/11 Plotters to Military
Commissions (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/ApriV 1-ag-42 .html.
43. See Benjamin Wittes & Robert M. Chesney, The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0, The Guantanamo Cases
as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (May 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/
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The foregoing analysis contemplates those detainees being held at the Guantinamo Bay
facility, but thousands remain held abroad. Following release or transfer of hundreds of
detainees in Cuba, 167 remain interned.4s Of these, thirty have been cleared for release,
but cannot return to their homes for risk of reprisals there, such as four Chinese Uighurs
detained in Afghanistan. Those individuals are awaiting the outcome of negotiations for
resettlement in other countries. Another ninety are Yemeni, sixty of which are cleared to
return, but are under a moratorium on any transfers to Yemen. Accordingly, out of the
more than 800 detainees since the opening of Guantinamo, thirty-four will be charged.
The Law of War provides for detention until the cessation of hostilities. But we are en-
gaged in a conflict that could last for decades, well beyond the lifetime of those in deten-
tion. Meanwhile, Article V of the Third Geneva Convention provides the right to a
military tribunal to determine one's status as a detainee under Article V, or trial as a
civilian under Article IV. Many of the detainees were brought in for bounty rewards, and
U.S. forces captured only five percent of them. 49 Combatant Status Review Tribunals
were established to review whether the detainees should be held, but significant questions
surrounding the quality of evidence and availability of witnesses still in Afghanistan, as
well as lack of representation, raised concerns that the process reflected poorly on U.S.
ideals of justice, and the ideals for which it fights for in the first place. None of these
concerns seems to have been settled in any meaningful way in 2011. Recently, the com-
mander at Guantanamo Bay issued a "draft order" requiring the review of all attorney-
client communications by a "privilege team" composed of law enforcement officials.50
Such unilateral and Congressional restrictions on the executive will only lead to further
judicial intervention in the near and long term.
V. Canadian Developments
In 2011, Canada renewed its commitment to national security. Some of the more notable
2011 developments include:
A. STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURI-Y ACT
On March 23, 2011, Bill C-42 "An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act" received Royal
Assent. The amendment authorizes an operator of an aircraft to provide to a competent
authority in a foreign state any information that is in the operator's control relating to
persons on board or expected to be on board the aircraft if:
(i) the aircraft will depart Canada and fly to the foreign state;
(ii) the aircraft will depart Canada, fly over the United States, and land outside
Canada;
48. Anthony D. Romero, Why Hasn't Obama Closed Guantdnamo?, PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2011), http://
www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/tag/prisoners/.
49. MARK DENBEAUX El' AL., A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DATA 2 (2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/230/guantanamo-report.pdf.
50. Guantanamo Commander Proposes Restrictions on Attorney Client Communications, INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROF BLOG (Dec. 28, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/internationallaw/2011/12/guantanamo-com-
mander-proposes-restrictions-for-attorney-client-communications.html.
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(iii) a Canada aircraft will depart any place outside Canada and will land in the foreign
state; or
(iv) a Canada aircraft will depart any place outside Canada and fly over the United
States.
This provision overrides section 5 of the Personal Information and Electronic Docu-
ments Act.51
B. ASSETS OF CoRRuPT FoREIGN OFFICIALS Acr
On March 23, 3011, Bill C-61 "Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act" received Royal
Assent.52 This new law authorizes the Government of Canada to freeze the assets of "po-
litically exposed foreign persons" at the request of a foreign state. The Canadian Cabinet
may prohibit the following activities:
(i) the dealing, directly or indirectly, by an person in Canada or Canadian outside
Canada in any property, wherever situated, of the politically exposed person;
(ii) the entering or facilitating, directly or indirectly, by any person in Canada or Cana-
dian outside Canada, of any financial transaction relating to (i); and
(iii) the provision by any person in Canada or Canadian outside Canada of financial
services or other related services in respect of property of the politically exposed
foreign person.5 3
On or about March 23, 2011, Canada passed Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Offi-
cials (Tunisia and Egypt) Regulations, SOR/2011-78 listing Tunisian and Egyptian politi-
cally exposed persons.5 4
C. BIL C-10
Bill C-10, the "Safe Streets and Communities Act" was introduced in Canada's House
of Commons and immediately drew criticism.55 Notwithstanding the criticism, Bill C-10
is expected to pass Canada's House of Commons and Senate because the Conservative
Party controls both branches of government.
Part I of Bill C-10 introduces a new statute, the "Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act,"
which is intended to deter acts of terrorism in Canada and outside Canada. This act
establishes a cause of action that allows victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators and their
supporters (including foreign governments that support terrorists).56
51. An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C 2011, chA-2 (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5002078&file=4.
52. Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, Pub. No. 40-3-C61-E (Mar. 24, 2011), available at http://
www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/40/3/c61-e.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Tunisia and Egypt) Regulations, SOR/2011-78 (Can.).
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D. NEW IRAN SANCIONS
On October 17, 2011 and November 21, 2011, Canada expanded the 2010 unilateral
sanctions imposed against Iran under the Special Economics Measures (Iran) Regulations.
More notably, Canada prohibits persons in Canada and Canadians abroad:
(i) from selling most goods used in the petrochemical, oil or natural gas industry; and
(ii) from providing or acquiring financial services to, from or for the benefit of, or on
the direction or order of, Iran or any person in Iran (with limited exceptions).57
57. Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.).
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